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REPUTATION AS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTIBLE
INTEREST
I. Introduction
State courts and legislatures have long recognized that a person has a legal
right to enjoy his reputation free of false or derogatory characterizations by
others.1 Any unjustified statement which casts an individual in some unfavorable
light will constitute an infringement of his reputational right and will give rise to
an action for civil defamation.' That elaborate body of law is designed to
provide a forum where an individual may publicly restore his tarnished character
and possibly recover monetary damages.'
There is little reason to doubt the adequacy of this state remedy when one
private individual defames another.4 Generally, the community is unwilling to
accept a blanket derogatory appraisal of one man by another man.5 The mere
fact that the wrongdoer is an employee of government does not necessarily
change this reaction. Those occupying low level positions in government do not,
in the community's view, speak on behalf of the state. Thus, the word of a
secretary, busdriver, schoolteacher, or custodian does not take on more importance
because that person happens to be a state or federal employee.
The situation is, however, drastically changed when a community-wide
campaign to label someone a "criminal," "drunkard," or "Communist," is
precipitated or condoned by the police, mayor, governor, Congress, or the
President.6 Given the weight attributed by society to the word of public officials,
and the high degree of trust society places in their offices, a party will be unable
to effectively combat, in a state court proceeding, the effects of defamatory
characterizations made by such officials. Once these public officials "brand"
someone in the community, the community's thought and impressions about him
change. Relationships with family, friends, employers, and neighbors may
become strained, or completely severed.! Unfortunately, personal opinion will
change and become fixed before a state court has occasion to speak. A public
forum and the award of damages after the fact cannot undo either the deep and
unforgettable harm suffered by an innocent victim, or remove the impression
etched upon the minds of those around him.' The only means of adequately
1 Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alas. 1964); Short v. News-
Journal Co., 58 Del. 592, 212 A.2d 718 (1965); Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 30 N.J. 320,
153 A.2d 36 (1959); and Rainier's Dairies v. Rariton Valley Farms, 19 NJ. 552, 117 A.2d
889 (1955).
2 MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959); and Smith
v. Los Angeles Bookbinders Union, 133 Cal. App. 2d 486, 284 P.2d 194 (1955).
3 Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 231 A.2d 753 (1967).
4 Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5 Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966); Lamberti v. Sun
Printing Ass'n., 111 App. Div. 437, 97 N.Y.S. 694 (1906); and Hanson v. Fueling, 160 Wis.
511, 152 N.W. 287 (1915).
6 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); and
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Cf. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
7 Id.
8 400 U.S. 433.
protecting an individual from such harm is to invoke the preventive safeguards
of the Constitution, namely procedural due process.'
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 0 provide
that before government may deprive an individual of an interest in "life,"
"'liberty," or "property," it is incumbent upon the government to afford that
person notice and an opportunity to be heard. The importance of this
federal safeguard is that it permits an individual to contest and possibly prevent
the implementation of proposed governmental action before any harm is actually
incurred."
The Supreme Court, in Wieman v. Updegraff,'2 held that defamatory at-
tacks by government upon a citizen's reputation may constitute a deprivation of
"liberty." Conceived in the hectic days of the "Red Scare" following World
War II, the notion of a constitutional interest in reputation was originally
adopted to limit the government's ability to label someone a "communist"
without having to substantiate the truth of that label. This standard curbed the
government's discretion in defaming a citizen; however, its importance waned as
the nation's fears of communism slowly diminished.
Recently, the issue of reputation as a federally protectible interest has again
come to the fore. With the current surge in crime, a concerned public has
demanded vigorous law enforcement.' 3 Federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies have responded by employing stringent investigative procedures. A
police department may, for example, distribute to area merchants the name and
photograph of "known" and "active" shoplifters thought to be operating in
the community, regardless of whether or not the individual actually has been
tried or convicted. The potential for harm is immense. Since the police are
viewed as authorities in criminal justice, the community will generally accept the
characterization of an individual as a criminal. Should the official "label," how-
ever, prove to be false, the question arises as to whether the police department's
conduct is merely a traditional state defamation or a deprivation of "liberty" in
violation of the Constitution.
In Paul v. Davis" the Supreme Court reexamined the early cases of the
"Cold War." It held that only when a defamation by the'state is accompanied
by the loss of some other "property" or "liberty" interest will the official char-
acterization constitute a deprivation of "liberty." Thus, the repute of one's name,
standing alone, is not an independent constitutional interest.
9 Id.
10 The fifth amendment applies to the federal government; it provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.
The fourteenth amendment, applicable to the several states reads:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
11 See e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. .565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471(1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); and Baldwin v.
Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864).
12 344 U.S. 183. For the facts of this case see note 72, supra.
13 See, R. MEDALm & P. WOLf, CRIME-A COMMUNITY REsroNDs, (Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, 1967).
14 See. e.g., the procedure employed to inhibit shoplifting during the Christmas season
in Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 '(U.S. March 23, 1976).
15 Id.
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The application of the Court's analysis produces most unsettling results.
Government is now permitted to intentionally inflict grave personal harm upon an
individual's character so long as it does not also deprive him of some interest
ensured by the fifth or fourteenth amendments. Although relief may be available
in state court after the defamation occurs, an award of monetary damages cannot
neutralize the effects of an egregious label bestowed by government.
The only effective means of protecting a citizen's good name is to afford that
individual an opportunity to contest proposed state action before it is effected.
That objective could be attained by considering one's "name" as "property"
within the meaning of the Constitution. While the Court has yet to address this
issue, its decisions would permit such a construction of the due process clause.
I. Reputation Under State Law
The common law of each state recognizes that an individual holds a
property interest in his name and reputation." Recognition of an individual's
reputation as a state property interest has given rise to the law of civil defama-
tion.'" That body of law-composed of the twin torts of libel" and slander " -
is designed to ensure one's right to remain free of false20 and unjustified 2' attacks
upon his personal character. Despite the fact the law of defamation is riddled
with "anomalies and absurdities," 22 its underlying theory is clear. Any unjustified
communication which tends to diminish an individual's standing in his com-
munity constitutes an infringement of his property right in reputation. 2 Such
communications may take one of several forms24 and may impute a variety of
16 Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1927); Schulman v. Whitabker,
117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906); Magovirk v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Miss. 632,
31 So. 206 (1902); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631
(1937); and Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 457, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940). Cf. Green,
Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
17 Rainier's Dairies v. Rariton Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1935).
18 Libel involves a written defamation and is actionable without any showing of special
damages if the published statement is defamatory on its face. See, Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976); J. GATLEY, LIBEL &
SLANDER, 1 141, (7th ed. 1974).
19 Slander involves an oral defamation and does not generally give rise to a cause of action
unless there is a showing of pecuniary loss. Id. However, a slanderous statement which
charges an individual with an infamous crime, Wooton v. Martin, 140 Ky. 781, 131 S.W. 783
(1910), a loathsome disease, McDonald v. Nugent, 122 Iowa 651, 98 N.W. 506 (1904), or
incompetency in a trade, Biggerstaff v. Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P.2d 1098 (1941),
is actionable regardless of monetary loss. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 573 (1938);
GATLEY, supra note 18 at 73.
20 Truth is a complete defense to an action for defamation. See, e.g., Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
21 As to the various defenses that are available to a defendant in an action for defama-
tion, see GATLEY, supra note 18 at 151; W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 114, '(4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as "PRoSSER"]; and E. SEELMAN, THE LAw OF LIBEL & SLANDER, 11 170,
(1964). Cf. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 CoLo. L. REv. 463 (1909).
22 PROSSER at 737.
23 Id. at 739-44; J. SALMoND, LAw OF TORTS, 398 '(8th ed. 1934); and G. BOWER,
AcTIONABLE DEFAMATION, 4 (2d ed. 1923).
24 Aku v. Lewis, 52 Hawaii 366, 477 P.2d 162 (1970) (television broadcast); Gibson v.
Kincaid, 140 Ind. App. 186, 221 N.E.2d 834 (1967) (radio broadcast); Thayer v. Worcester
Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933) (photograph); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94,
151 A.2d 476 (1959) (gestures and acts); and Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 224
S.E.2d 132 (Va. 1976).
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derogatory characteristics.25 However, a significant number of recent decisions
involve the mass media and imputations of criminal activity or commercial
wrongdoing.2
The primary purpose in providing a means of redress for defamatory com-
munications is to permit an aggrieved person the opportunity to publicly vih-
dicate his good name.27 A plaintiff who makes out such a case is, as a matter of
law, also entitled to pecuniary damages.28 Generally, an injured party may re-
cover punitive damages when actual malice or recklessness is proven; 29 special
damages, when the loss of a specific benefit is shown;8" and general damages,
which are presumed to flow from certain remarks.8 Nominal damages will also
be assessed when the plaintiff demonstrates no more than the technical elements
of a cause of action. 2
Thus, state law is designed to redress harms ranging from a mere nominal
defamation to injuries suffered as a result of intentional and malicious wrongdo-
ing. It is important to emphasize, however, that state law does not provide
remedial action until the harm to one's reputation has been imposed. In order
to challenge governmental action before that time, an individual must rely upon
the due process protections of the Constitution.
III. Constitutional Protections
A. Procedural Due Process
The protections afforded by the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments are, for the most part, procedural in nature.3" Although the
concept of due process has been described as "elusive!"' and "undefinable,"3 its
fundamental requisites generally include notice and the opportunity to be heard
before the government acts. 6 These elements are deeply rooted in the federal
25 Katz v. Rosen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 121 Cal. Rptr. 852, (1975) (unethical conduct);
Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, (1975)
(prostitution); Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1963) (mental
impairment); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974) (adultery); Stone v. Essex
County Newspaper, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975) (commission of a crime). See also,
Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976)
(improper business conduct); Axelband v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960) (untruth-
fulness).
26 Welsh v. Chicago Tribune Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 340 N.E.2d 539 '(1975); Troman
v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Levine v. Kiss, 47 App. Div. 2d 544, 363
N.Y.S.2d 101 (1975); and Dill v. Rader, 533 P.2d 650 (Okla. 1975).
27 Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 231 A.2d 753 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS, § 577, comment b (1938).
28 Hanson v. Krehbeil, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904); Ball v. White, 3 Mich. App. 579,
143 N.W.2d 188 (1966); and Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 *(1904).
29 Saunders Hardware Five & Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1975); Mauk v.
Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (1903).
30 Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917); Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23,
81 A. 1013 (1911).
31 Indianapolis Newspaper Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651 (1970); Hughes
v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916).
32 Hutchens v. Kuker, 168 Neb. 451, 96 N.W.2d 228 (1963); Jones v. Hester, 262 N.C.
487, 137 S.E.2d 846 '(1969).
33 See, 341 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34 Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
35 Id.
36 Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882).
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common law of this country and are recognized as basic to our system of juris-
prudence." The right to prior notice and hearing is, however, not absolute. A
person is entitled to these procedural safeguards only when the government's
activity infringes upon some interest protected by the Constitution. ss
B. Substantive Due Process
Although the state may adhere to the procedural requirements of the Con-
stitution, the significance of those procedures will be reduced to mere formalities
when the state proceeds to enact arbitrary and capricious legislation. To prevent
such an abuse, the Supreme Court has fashioned the doctrine of "substantive due
process."3 9 Roughly defined, substantive due process is the federal guarantee
that no person shall be deprived of a Constitutional right as the result of an
unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of legislative power.4" Any action deemed to
be violative of this doctrine constitutes a usurpation of legislative authority and is
null and void.4 ' To invoke this protection, however, an aggrieved party must
demonstrate more than mere hardship or an error in legislative judgment.4 2 It
must be shown that a statute places unlimited discretion in the hands of a public
official to adversely affect his interest in "life," "liberty," or "property." 43
C. The Liberty Interest
The concept of "liberty" found within the fifth and fourteenth amendments
has never been precisely defined by the Supreme Court.44 It is one of the
"majestic" 45 constitutional terms which must draw its meaning from time and
experience.4" Clearly, however, the concept is not limited solely to the freedom
against bodily restraint." The Court has viewed liberty as encompassing the
right to contract,4" to engage in a particular livelihood,49 and to obtain an educa-
tion. With respect to the general nature of that doctrine, the Court has ob-
served that liberty extends to "those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'"
37 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1947).
38 Id.
39 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
41 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934);
and Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
42 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); and Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115
U.S. 512 (1885).
43 291 U.S. 502; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
44 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
45 National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
46 Id.
47 262 U.S. 390.
48 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918); Chicago, Burl. & Quin. R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 547
(1911); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884); and Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
49 Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917);
Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Minnesota
v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
50 262 U.S. 390.
51 Id. at 399.
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Since personal and business relationships are built upon personal trust and
confidence, 2 the right to protect one's reputation is clearly "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness."5 A good reputation in the community is a funda-
mental requisite of friendship,54 employment,5 a professional career,56 the bor-
rowing of money," and the extension of credit.5 Indeed, this intangible interest
provides the lifeblood for the entire constitutional scheme of ensuring an in-
dividual's liberty.5 Such rights as the freedom to contract and to engage in a
chosen occupation would become meaningless if government officials could sum-
marily impose false or degrading labels upon any citizen.6" Thus, as one's repu-
tation is diminished in the community, his chances of pursuing a normal daily life
are similarly diminished. Given this fact, an individual's good name and reputa-
tion certainly deserves the protections afforded by the due process clause to liberty
interests.
D. The Property Interest
The fifth and fourteenth amendments also require that due process of law
be afforded an individual when the government deprives him of an interest in
"property."'" To have a property interest within the ambit of the Constitution,
a person must have secured some benefit by way of the statutory or common law
of the state or federal government.6 2 Furthermore, he must possess a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to that benefit.65 An individual has such a claim when the
source of the government's privilege causes him to justifiably rely upon its con-
tinuation in his daily life. 4 Thus, a statute conferring welfare benefits for an
indefinite period of time creates an "entitlement" to the continued receipt of
payments; 5 but an employment contract that is silent as to renewal does not
create an "entitlement" to re-employment.6
State law recognizes the existence of a property interest in one's character
and good name.6 To protect that right, an elaborate body of legal principles has
been created by state courts and legislatures." Considering the extent of the
state's concern for reputation, it is difficult to challenge the proposition that an
individual has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in the continual protection of
his personal reputation. Unlike contractual rights, which expire on a pre-
52 Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 670, 111 So. 55 (1927).
53 262 U.S. 390, 399.
54 162 La. 670, 111 So. 55.
55 344 U.S. 183.
56 328 U.S. 303.
57 Hinlde v. Alexander, 244 Ore. 267, 411 P.2d 829 (1966); Martin v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
58 Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970).
59 262 U.S. 390.
60 Id.
61 See, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 345 '(1970).
62 408 U.S. 564, 576.
63 Id. at 577.
64 Id. See also 397 U.S. 345.
65 Id.
66 408 U.S. 565. But see, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
67 See note 16 supra.
68 See, Donnelly, History of Defamation, [1949] Wis. L. Rnv. 99; Lovell, The "Reception"
of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VA"s. L. Rlv. 1051 (1962); and Veeder, The History
and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COL. L. Rlv. 546 (1903).
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determined date, an individual has under state law a legal expectation, through-
out his lifetime, to be free of unjustified attacks upon his reputation."
Hence, official statements or conduct which tends to diminish the reputation
and good name of an individual may also constitute a deprivation of property
in contravention of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
IV. Reputation as a Constitutional Liberty Interest
A. Paul v. Davis"
The notion that reputation is a protectible "liberty" interest has been
recognized by the Supreme Court since the early days of the Cold War following
the end of the Second World War.7 The development of that concept has been
most confusing."2 The problem stems from the fact that the Court never laid
69 The right to enjoy one's reputation terminates at death. Kelly v. Johnson Publishing
Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958); Hughes v. New England Newspaper Co.,
312 Mass. 178, 43 N.E.2d 657 (1942). In the absence of a statute, the death of the defamed
party abates a pending action which he has commenced. Thompson v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
193 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1953).
70 44 U.S.L.W. 4337.
71 344 U.S. 183.
72 For example in Cafeteria Workers, the petitioner, an employee of a privately owned
cafeteria operating on the premises of the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D.C., was sum-
marily dismissed from her employment duties for failing to satisfy the security requirements
promulgated by the factory's security officer. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's
claim that the government's characterization of her as a "security risk" plus the loss of herjob was a deprivation of "liberty." Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, distinguished
this case from Wieman.
Wieman involved a constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma statute which required state
employees to take a loyalty oath as a condition of their employment. The oath required a
public employee to state that he was not a member of any organization listed by the Attorney
General of the United States as a "communist" or "subversive" group. The appellants failed,
within the prescribed period, to submit to the oath. The appellee, a citizen and taxpayer of
the United States, brought suit in district court to enjoin the state from paying compensation
to the appellants. The Court struck down the statute as an arbitrary exercise of legislative
authority:
Yet under the Oklahoma Act, the fact of association alone determines disloyalty or
disqualification; it matters not whether the association existed innocently or knowingly.
To thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic
expression and controversy at one of its chief sources.... Indiscriminate classification
of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The
oath offends due process.
Id. at 191.
The Court in Wieman also stated:
There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded from
public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain
is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy.
Id. at 190-91 (emphasis supplied).
In Cafeteria Workers, the Court was convinced by the government's assertion that the
characterization of Miss Brawner as a "security risk" would not affect her chances of obtaining
public employment elsewhere. Therefore, since the former governmental employee had not
been excluded from other public positions, the Court held that the labeling of the petitioner
and the loss of her job did not constitute a deprivation of "liberty."
Ten years after its decision in Cafeteria Workers, the Supreme Court, in Constantineau,
once again applied the Wieman standard. However, the Constantineau Court placed no sig-
nificance upon the employment factor so heavily emphasized in Cafeteria Workers.
Constantineau involved a state statute which made it a misdemeanor to sell or give
alcoholic beverages to persons deemed to be alcoholics by:
. . . the wife of such person, the supervisors of any town, the alderman of any
city, the trustees of any village, the county superintendent . . . the mayor . . . the




down the criteria necessary to bring a defamation within the scope of the Con-
stitution. Although some guidelines were discussed in the early cases, they Were
completely disregarded in subsequent decisions."'
It was not until 1976 that the Court, in Paul v. Davis,"' attempted to con-
ciliate this substantial body of case law and to isolate the requisite elements of an
unconstitutional defamation. In Paul, local police had distributed flyers to area
businessmen which included the names and photographs of "known" and
"active" shoplifters thought to be operating in the community. Appearing on the
flyers were the name and "mug shot" of Charles Davis. He had been arrested for
a shoplifting charge but was not convicted. Davis argued that the state's labeling
of him as a "thief," without an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, was violative of procedural due process. The Court,
following a careful review of the precedents, rejected Davis' claim. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that prior cases called for the showing
of two elements-defamation by a public official and a substantial alteration or
extinguishment of a state right or status. Since Davis was unable to establish the
latter element, his action was dismissed.
B. A Conjunctive Test
1. A Badge of Infamy
The first part of the formulation of the Court in Paul requires the showing
of an infamous characterization by government officials. Previous cases,"' as well
as Paul, have indicated that the government must impose, in the view of the com-
munity, a "deep stain"' or a "badge of infamy"7 upon some innocent person.
A charge by government that an individual within the community has com-
mitted some shocking, brutal, or shameful act, is an essential element to establish-
ing a Constitutional claim." If, as a consequence of such a "branding," the com-
munity displays no respect or regard for the defamed party, the government's
conduct may offend due process." Thus, for example, a traditional state def-
Wis. STAT. § 176.26(2) (1967).
The police chief of Hartford, Wisconsin caused to be posted a notice in all retail liquor stores
in Hartford that sales or gifts of liquor to Miss Constantineau were prohibited for a period of
one year. Although there was no indication that the "posted" individual had been foreclosed
from obtaining public employment, the Court, per Justice Douglas, found that the police
chief's characterization of the appellee as a "drunkard" was defamatory and violative of pro-
cedural due process:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential.
400 U.S. at 437 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, the question after Constantineau was: what must the government be doing to an
individual in order to constitute a deprivation of liberty? The answer was supplied by the
Court in Paul. See, text accompanying note 74 infr.
73 Compare, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183.
74 44 U.S.L.W. 4337.
75 400 U.S. 433 and 344 U.S. 183.
76 344 U.S. at 191.
77 Id.




amation takes on Constitutional dimensions when the government accuses one
of being a "communist" bent upon the destruction of the American political
system,"' or a "drunkard," unable to care for himself or his family."'
In limited instances, however, the government may be able to override an
individual's desire to be free of denigrating characterizations. For instance, when
the state has probable cause to believe an individual has committed a criminal
offense it may arrest and prosecute that person in order to establish the truth of
its allegation at trial. Since the proceeding effectuates society's interest in pre-
venting certain conduct, any adverse publicity to the defendant's reputation is
generally disregarded by the courts.82 Should the defendant be eventually
acquitted, the state's accusations will not give rise to an action for defamation;
otherwise, our system of criminal justice would effectively be paralyzed. 2 How-
ever, when state officials arrest without probable cause, 4 maliciously prosecute, 5
or attempt to publicly characterize someone as a "criminal" without providing
for him a trial," the delicate balance between individual and societal rights is
disturbed. Consequently, such conduct by the government will be actionable
in state court. This tortious conduct may also constitute a deprivation of liberty
if it further operates to deprive an innocent individual of some constitutional
interest in "liberty" or "property."
2. Deprivation of a Liberty or Property Interest
The second part of Paul's conjunctive test, that there be a substantial altera-
tion or extinguishment of a state right or status, has been the source of persistent
confusion. 7 Early decisions of the Court, for example, required that government
foreclose a citizen from public employment;88 recent cases, however, have sug-
gested that a showing beyond the "badge of infamy" is unnecessary. " The
majority in Paul reconciled the precedents by noting that each involved conduct
by the government which deprived an individual of some form of government
largess, such as the loss of all public employment opportunities" or the ability to
purchase alcoholic beverages.9 1 Such rights are, of course, "property" and "lib-
erty" interests within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. "2
Thus, the Court held that to bring reputation within the liberty concept, it is
necessary to show state defamation plus the loss of some constitutional interest in
property or liberty. The deprivation of such an interest is, however, standing
alone, violative of due process. Hence, there is no need to inquire as to the im-
80 344 U.S. 183 See also, 341 U.S. 123 and 328 U.S. 303.
81 400 U.S. 433.
82 See, Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEx. L.
REv. 157, 168 (1937). See also, Flynn v. Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513, 129 N.W. 674 (1911);
note 21 supra.
83 Harper, supra at 174.
84 Boies v. Raynor, 89 Ariz. 257, 361 P.2d 1 (1961); House v. Ane, 538 P.2d 320
(Hawaii 1975); Gigler v. City of Klamath Falls, 537 P.2d 121 (Ore. 1975).
85 Prentice v. Bertken, 50 Cal. App. 2d 344, 123 P.2d 96 (1942).
86 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
87 See note 72 supra.
88 367 U.S. 886; 344 U.S. 183; 328 U.S. 303.
89 400 U.S. 433.
90 344 U.S. 183 and 328 U.S. 303.
91 400 U.S. 433.
92 See text accompanying notes 44-69, infra.
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pact of the state's characterization upon one's good name. No matter how great
a harm may have been imposed, there can be no encroachment of due process
unless the government's action curtails the enjoyment of another state benefit or
a right protected under the first ten amendments to the Constitution.93
By failing to treat reputation as an independently protectible interest, the
Court has created a device whereby law enforcement agencies can, for example,
summarily and deliberately categorize any individual as a convicted "prostitute,"
"rapist," or "child-molester" without first affording such person the opportunity
to contest such an action by these agencies.9" So long as government could design
a scheme which does not deprive the victim of a right, other than the right to his
good name, there would be no violation of the Constitution and no need for prior
notice and hearing. According to the Court's decision in Paul, a person's right
to seek redress in state court after the damage has been inflicted will act to deter
public officials from taking such defamatory action. Should the state remedy
prove an inadequate deterrent, however, the results may be devastating and ir-
reparable. The "post-deprivation" remedies available at the state level do not
always provide a sufficient form of relief.9 When a private citizen attacks the
reputation of another, a state remedy after the publication has been made or
released is generally adequate.9" In such instances, the community normally
gives equal consideration to the word of the defamed individual.9" When the
wrongdoer is the government, however, the balance between the weight given
to the statements of the respective parties drastically shifts in favor of the state.9"
Once the state "brands" an individual, there is substantial risk that the minds
of his associates will be indelibly marked.99 Public opinion may change, possibly
resulting in a hesitancy on the part of the community to interact with that in-
dividual.' There may be serious impairment of the defamed individual's ability
to lead a normal personal and business life.'
In order to adequately protect a private citizen, some mechanism must be
made available to offset the heavy weight attributed by the community to the
words and actions of government. That mechanism-prior notice and the op.
portunity to be heard-is embodied within the due process clause"2 To trigger
those protections, however, one must bring a claim of defamation within the
concept of "liberty" or "property." In Paul, a firmly divided Court has made it
most difficult to bring such a claim within the parameters of "liberty." A viable
alternative may be found by treating reputation as an interest in "property."
93 44 U.S.L.W. at 4340-41.
94 Id. at 4346, n.9 (Brennan, J.,, dissenting).
95 See, e.g., 383 U.S. at 93 '(Stewart, J., concurring). Note, Damages in Per Se Defama-
tion, 46 N.C.L. Rrv. 160, 166-67 (1967).
96 Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d at 660; Palmer v. Mahin, 120 F. 737(8th Cir. 1903). Cf. RnSTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 623 (1938); and note 31, infra.
97 See, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392; Sassower v. Himwich, 236 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1962).
98 367 U.S. at 901-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357
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V. Reputation as a Constitutional Property Interest
A. The Nature of a "Property" Interest
Constitutional protection of "property" is designed to safeguard 'those
interests from which a person has obtained certain benefits.' Until recently, the
Supreme Court held that only where a person was entitled to benefits as matter
of "right," as opposed to a mere "privilege," would a constitutional challenge
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.' In 1970, however, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly0 5 formally
abandoned the rigid "right-privilege" doctrine and adopted an approach
whereby the impact of the state action upon the private individual is examined.'
Goldberg presented the question of whether a state could validly terminate public
assistance payments to welfare recipients without first offering the recipient a
hearing. The Court determined that when government confers some benefit
upon its citizenry, that benefit may not be revoked without first providing an
individual adequate notice and a meaningful hearing.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court gave further indication of the
kind of property interests which are deemed worthy of constitutional protection.
In that case the majority held that a non-tenured instructor at a state university
did not possess a property interest in a contract with the state beyond the termina-
tion date of the agreement. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart de-
clared:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it.1O8
Although property interests are protected by the Constitution, Roth further noted
that the origin of those interests is "an independent source such as state law.' 0"
The Court completed its picture of a property interest in Goss v. Lopez".
where nine public high school students were suspended without notice by the
principal for alleged misconduct. Responding to the school board's argument
that the students had been suspended for only a period of ten days, the Court
held that the test of length and severity of a deprivation "is irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause."'' Rather, the
controlling factor is the nature of the interest deprived; so long as the individual's
concern is not de minimis, the protections of due process may be invoked.
103 408 U.S. at 576.
104 See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954). Cf. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1439(1968).
105 397 U.S. 254.
106 See, Comment, Due Process Clause Requires Prior Hearing Before Termination of
Welfare Benefits, 23 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 422 (1971).
107 408 U.S. 565.
108 Id. at 577.
109 Id.
110 419 U.S. 565.
111 Id. at 576.
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Given the broad parameters of "property" as developed by Goldberg, Roth,
and Goss, and the myriad benefits conferred by the state upon its citizens, it is
not surprising that property interests take on a wide variety of forms. For ex-
ample, the termination of welfare benefits," 2 wages,"'8 an education, 14 a driver's
license,1 5 and parole rights1 6 may not be effected without due regard for the
Constitution.
There is no apparent reason to exclude an individual's reputation from this
growing list of property interests. The right to protect one's good name clearly
satisfies the Supreme Court's formula of establishing a constitutional interest in
property. The reputational right, which is derived from the common law of the
states, creates a legitimate expectation that a person may enjoy his good name
without unjustified interference by the government. As to the importance of this
concern, Mr. Justice Stewart has observed:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being.117
1. Reputation and the Three Elements of Property
The protection of one's "name" readily satisfies the requirement, established
in Roth, that a constitutionally protected property interest must derive from an
independent source. The common law of England"8 and of this country'
has long recognized that an individual's "name" is a state property interest and,
as such, is deserving of the legal protections afforded thereto.
An individual's concern for his reputation similarly meets the Roth mandate
that one possess a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in the continued enjoyment
of a state right. An individual's reputation is protected against unjustified in-
vasions by the law of defamation. At any time during his lifetime,' an in-
dividual may avail himself of the remedies provided by state law to redress
slanderous or libelous conduct. The only event which terminates this personal
right is the individual's death. 2' Unquestionably, this factor instills in a person
a legitimate claim to the continual enjoyment of his reputational right. Unlike
the contractual rights in Roth, which expired on a predetermined date, a person
has a justifiable expectation throughout his lifetime to be free of wrongful attacks
upon his reputation.
Although Goldberg and many other "property" cases involved the dis-
tribution and attempted revocation of tangible property, the form of the largessbestowed by the state is immaterial. Goss, which involved the right to obtain a
112 397 U.S. 254.
113 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
114 419 U.S. 565.
115 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
116 408 U.S. at 471.
117 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
118 See, Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L. Q. REv. 255 (1902).
119 See, Lovell, supra note 68 at 1051.
120 See note 16 infra.
121 Id.
122 See notes 112-116 supra.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
free public education, supports the contention that intangible concerns are
equally deserving of the protections afforded physical forms of property. Clearly,
then, the impalpable freedom against unjustified invasions of one's good name is
a rightful expectation, and more than a mere "abstract need" or "unilateral
expectation."
The final prerequisite to an invocation of the due process clause involves
an examination of the deprived interest. The Court is not concerned with the
gravity or weight of the resulting injury; rather, it inquires as "to the nature of
the interest at stake.' 2  That interest must be more than of de minimis im-
portance. 4
What precisely constitutes a de minimis interest is not readily ascertainable.
However, when those interests, which the Court has found to be of more than
insubstantial importance, 12 are collectively viewed the de minimis standard
begins to take form. The most glaring common characteristic of these interests
is that each is necessary to maintain a decent and respectable life as known and
enjoyed by modem society. For example, an individual's wages and welfare
benefits are certainly an essential requisite since their loss may mean that one's
family will go without food, clothing, or heat. 2 ' Likewise, termination of a
driver's license may result in the loss of employment." 7 Depriving children of
the ability to obtain an education is perhaps the most severe punishment a gov-
ernment may impose upon a minor; "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education.""' The loss of parole will result in the bodily restraint of the
individual. 29
The continued enjoyment of one's good reputation is essential to leading a
normal life."' It underlies, for instance, the ability to seek and hold gainful
employment,"' to purchase a home or car,"' and to enjoy normal relationships
with family and friends."' Therefore, since the protection of one's "name" is
created by state law and instills in an individual a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it, the reputational right should be considered "property" within the meaning
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Under this construction of the Con-
stitution, government would be prevented from bestowing a "badge of infamy"
upon an individual without first permitting that person an opportunity to contest
the validity of the badge.
B. A Practical Consideration
The inclusion of reputation on the Constitution's list of property interests
creates an immediate and practical difficulty. Since the Supreme Court now
123 408 U.S. at 571.
124 419 U.S. at 575-76.
125 See, text accompanying notes 112-116 supra.
126 397 U.S. 264 (1970). Cf. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'rn., 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967).
127 402 U.S. 535.
128 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
129 408 U.S. 471.
130 See, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
131 344 U.S. 183.
132 Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178.
133 Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55.
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excludes from consideration the severity of the harm imposed,"' every de-
famatory state characterization effected without a prior hearing would be
violative of due process. Federal courts may soon find their dockets filled with
cases alleging no more than derogatory statements made by individuals employed
by government while acting within the scope of their authority.3 " District court
dockets are already overburdened with suits relating to other property interests.
One particularly troublesome area involves complaints filed by inmates of state
penal institutions against security guards. Much to their chagrin, federal trial
judges now find themselves adjudicating cases demanding the return of seven
packages of cigarettes, 3 7 one pair of shoes, 3s and $3.52."' The due process
clause, however, can be construed in such a way so as to alleviate the problem
of "small-claims" litigation in federal court.
VI. A Possible Construction of the Due Process Clause
It is an established principle of constitutional law that three elements must
be demonstrated in order to invoke the protections of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. First, there must be a deprivation of life, liberty, or property;
second, the deprivation must be caused by government; and third, it must have
occurred "without due process of law."' °
Although "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause,"'' at a minimum the phrase requires that gov-
ernment afford the aggrieved party an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."' 42 Generally, in those instances where a
deprivation of property cannot be measured in monetary terms, the only time
in which a "meaningful" hearing may be offered is before the loss is suffered. In
Goss, for example, it is difficult to imagine how the state could have adequately
redressed the harm done to a student's education resulting from a wrongful sus-
pension. Normally, the only effective means of protecting someone from in-
tangible injury is to prevent the implementation of the government's conduct.
On the other hand, when the harm to a property interest is slight and can
be fully compensated in terms of dollars, a hearing offered by government within
a reasonable time after the harm occurs could also be viewed as a meaningful
hearing. When a state prison guard, for instance, illegally confiscates personal
property belonging to an inmate, the taking should not be violative of due process
if a procedure is available whereby the prisoner may seek the return of his
134 419 U.S. at 575-76.
135 See, Comment, State Prisoner's Allegations Concerning the Imposition of Solitary Con-finement, the Conditions of that Confinement, and the Failure of Prison Officials to Return
His Diamond Ring, Were Each Sufficient to State a Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 51 NoTa' DAbiz LAW. 1046, 1057-62.
136 Id.
137 Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973).
138 Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972).
139 Weddle v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970).
140 Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J., concurring).
141 339 U.S. at 313.
142 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also, 339 U.S. 313 and Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
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property or reimbursement for the value of its loss."' If the state or federal
government, therefore, provides a means of fully and adequately redressing a
property harm effected by its agents, the deprivation will not have been imposed
without the due process of law. 44
Consequently, under this construction of the Constitution, federal courts
would be able to effectively limit the scope of their adjudications to cases which
probe the limits of'the "property" concept, in contradistinction to merely re-
dressing ordinary tortious conduct. It therefore vitiates the "floodgate" argu-
ment as a reason for excluding reputation from the constitutional protections
afforded property interests.
VII. Reputation and the Adequacy of the State Remedy
The adequacy of a state remedy provided after a defamation has occurred
is dependent upon the community's reaction to the characterization. 4 ' An
important factor to be considered is the source of the libelous or slanderous state-
ment. 4 When that source is a private individual there is little reason to question
the sufficiency of the available remedy."4 7 The truth of the characterization is a
matter of one man's word against another. 4" Recognizing that an individual's
judgment of his neighbor may be erroneous, in jest, or the result of a spiteful
motive, a community generally attaches equal weight to the word of both
parties." The potential for injury to one's reputation is, therefore, tempered by
the fact that society will consider the derogatory label with some degree of
skepticism.' Consequently, the harm resulting to an individual's good name is
generally neither significant nor irreparable.' A proceeding which permits
143 This notion was applied by Justice Stevens while a member of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). Cf. 523 F.2d at
1062-67.
144 Id. Where only property rights are at stake, the Supreme Court, on several occasions,
has held that the mere postponement of a hearing is not violative of procedural due process,
provided, however, the opportunity for a hearing subsequent to the harm is adequate. See, e.g.,
Fahey v. Malone, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1931); and
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
145 For example, a number of courts have held that when the utterance in question is de-
famatory or calculated to injure one's reputation, the statement is actionable although intended
in jest. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (1955). However, when a statement is
published in jest and is so understood by the recipient, no action for defamation will arise.
245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392.
146 245 Cal. App. 2d at 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 392; Lamberti v. Sun Printing & Publishing
Ass'n., 111 App. Div. 437, 97 N.Y.S. 694; and Hanson v. Fueling, 160 Wis. 511, 152 N.W. 287.
Cf. Note, supra note 95 at 164.
147 366 F.2d 649. Cf. Note, supra note 95 at 166-67.
148 In situations where the community remains neutral as to the defendant's characteriza-
tion of the plaintiff, a cause of action may still be established. However, relief is properly
limited to an award of nominal damages. See, Sassower v. Himwich, 236 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1962).
See also, Miller v. Woods, 338 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1960); Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 177
A.2d 665 (1962); and Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1975).
149 See note 146 supra.
150 Id.
151 A comparison of cases involving allegations of "communist" affiliation reveals that
characterizations by the government have more of an impact upon the community than those
of private individuals. Wieman, McGrath, Lovett, each involved an official defamatory charge
that resulted in severe economic consequences. However, in actions against private individuals,
the actual damages sustained generally fell short of such adverse results. Compare, Joopanenko
v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1953); Herrman v. Newark Moring Ledger Co., 48 N.J.




the defamed party to officially exonerate himself and recover damages is generally
adequate vindication. 52
This conclusion is not necessarily altered merely because the wrongdoer hap-
pens to be an employee of the government. However, when a citizen's opinions
and statements are regarded by society as the official view of the government,
the sufficiency of the state's remedial powers becomes questionable. No longer is
the truth a matter of one man's word against another; it is the word of govern-
ment against that of a private individual. The effect upon a community of an
unsavory label personally attached, for example, by the President,158 Congress, 5 '
a state legislature, 5 5 or the police, 5" is significantly different from the effect of a
defamatory statement made by an ordinary citizen. 57 Unlike private individuals,
government officials occupy positions of public trust and confidence; they also
maintain and have access to many sources of confidential and secretive informa-
tion. In the mind of the community, therefore, there can be no error in judgment
or spiteful motive; certainly government would not intentionally brand someone
a "criminal" or "communist" if it were not true.' 5  Since the government's label
is presumed to be correct, many members of the community will undeniably
accept the uncontested characterization of the defenseless individual. 55
In such instances a hearing after the government has acted may well be
meaningless. Once public officials bestow an infamous badge upon a citizen, it
will be most difficult for him to maintain harmonious relationships within the
community.' His ability, for example, to secure a job,' an education,8 2 and a
career. 8 may be severely curtailed. These harms, as well as many others, do not
lend themselves to a neat mathematical formula. Indeed, monetary damages
can never adequately compensate an individual for the loss of his ability to
engage in the normal activities of daily life. 4
Thus, the only effective means of protecting a person against such egregious
state action is to prevent it. The only "meaningful time" in which the govern-
ment can offer a "meaningful hearing" is before these harms are suffered. Thus,
the government's failure to afford a proceeding before it imposes a "badge of
infamy" should be violative of procedural due process.
152 See note 147 supra.
153 341 U.S. 123.
154 328 U.S. 303.
155 395 U.S. 411 and 344 U.S. 183.
156 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (police chief); 400 U.S. 433 (same).
157 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a defamatory attack by the govern-
ment may have an irreparable effect in the community. For example, in Goss, the Court
stated:
If sustained and recorded, those charges [of misconduct in school] could seriously
damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. 419 U.S. at
575.
This notion of irreparable harm is implicit in the rationale espoused by the Court in several
other cases. See, 367 U.S. at 901-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 344 U.S. 183 (loss of employ-
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Under this proposed interpretation of the due process clause, the fifth and
fourteenth amendments would be infringed only in those limited circumstances
in which public officials, occupying positions of trust and confidence, intentionally
or recklessly engage in a scheme to defame the name and reputation of an in-
nocent citizen. Federal courts, therefore, could reserve their resources for cases
involving substantial issues and, at the same time, ensure the legitimate expecta-
tion of all citizens to be free of serious official invasions upon their standing in the
community.
VIII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis clearly indicates that a citizen may
protect his reputation under the "liberty" concept of the Constitution. To
establish a constitutional claim, however, it must be shown that the government's
conduct will result in the loss of some other interest ensured by the fifth or
fourteenth amendment. Therefore, under Paul's formulation, the determinative
factor as to whether the due process clause applies is the nature of the injury
suffered; that is, the defamation must result in the loss of some other "property"
or "liberty" interest. Although defamation by a governmental official may seri-
ously impair an individual's reputation, without depriving him of a "property"
or another "liberty" interest, an individual is now unable to adequately protect
himself against such defamations although they may cause him irreparable
personal harm.
Needed protection for individual reputation may be provided, however, if
"reputation" is recognized as "property." The due process clause could, thus, be
invoked when the government's conduct operates to wrongfully "deprive" some-
one of his good name. Under this construction of the Constitution the controlling
factors would be the nature of the interest at stake and gravity of the harm
incurred. Such an interpretation of the due process clause is consistent with the
Court's definition of "property" as recently developed in Goldberg, Roth, and
Goss.
Hence, there exists a sound basis in reason and law to consider one's "repu-
tation" as a "property" interest. It is hoped that federal courts will consider
this notion when confronted with an official defamation of serious magnitude,
though not involving the loss of some other benefit conferred by the state or fed-
eral government.
Thomas J. Stalzer
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